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Abstract 
 
In the Ultimatum Game (UG) one player, named “proposer”, has to decide how to 
allocate a certain amount of money between herself and a “responder”. If the offer is 
greater than or equal to the responder’s minimum acceptable offer (MAO), then the 
money is split as proposed, otherwise, neither the proposer nor the responder get 
anything. The UG has intrigued generations of behavioral scientists because people in 
experiments blatantly violate the equilibrium predictions that self-interested proposers 
offer the minimum available non-zero amount, and self-interested responders accept. 
Why are these predictions violated? Previous research has mainly focused on the role 
of social preferences. Little is known about the role of general moral preferences for 
doing the right thing, preferences that have been shown to play a major role in other 
social interactions (e.g., Dictator Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma). Here I develop a 
theoretical model and an experiment designed to pit social preferences against moral 
preferences. I find that, although people recognize that offering half and rejecting low 
offers are the morally right things to do, moral preferences have no causal impact on 
UG behavior. The experimental data are indeed well fit by a model according to 
which: (i) high UG offers are motivated by inequity aversion and, to a lesser extent, 
self-interest; (ii) high MAOs are motivated by inequity aversion. 
 
Keywords: Ultimatum game; social preferences; moral preferences; inequity aversion; 
self-interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) has intrigued generations of social scientists. Thirty-five 
years after its invention, searching “ultimatum game” on google scholar generates 
over 58.000 results, and the 1982 paper by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, which 
famously introduced the game, has collected over 4.000 citations. The UG is, without 
any doubt, among the most studied economic games in social and biological sciences. 
But why? 
 
One factor is simplicity. The UG can be explained to literally everyone. There are two 
players and a pie. The first player, named “proposer”, has to decide how to divide the 
pie between herself and the second player, named “responder”. At the same time, the 
responder decides his minimum acceptable offer (MAO). If the proposer’s offer is 
higher than or equal to the responder’s MAO, then the pie is divided between the 
proposer and the responder as agreed; otherwise, no one get anything.  
 
Also the equilibrium analysis is very simple, at least if one assumes, as neo-classical 
economic theory does, that both the proposer and the responder are motivated by self-
interest, and that this is common knowledge: a self-interested responder would accept 
any non-zero offer; anticipating this behavior, a self-interested proposer would offer 
the smallest positive amount possible.  
 
However, these predictions are blatantly violated in laboratory experiments: offers 
below 25% are typically rejected, and the vast majority of offers lie between 30% and 
50% (Camerer, 2003; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Güth, 
Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982; Güth & Kocher, 2014; Henrich et al, 2001). Why 
do people violate the equilibrium predictions?  
 
Here it starts the interesting part of the story. As Güth and Kocher say in their 
exceptional review of thirty years of UG experiments: “motivations behind decisions 
in the ultimatum game are diverse” (Güth & Kocher, 2014, p. 397), and “[w]hat could 
not easily be anticipated is how socially, motivationally, and emotionally rich already 
the very simple ultimatum game turned out to be” (ibid., p. 406).  
 
What are these motivations? I will review them in detail in the next section. In short, 
previous research has mainly focused on the role of social preferences concluding 
that: high offers are driven by a combination of inequity aversion and self-interest1 
(e.g., Camerer, 2003); rejections of low offers are driven by a combination of inequity 
aversion and spitefulness (e.g., Yamagishi et al 2012; Brañas-Garza, Espín, 
Exadaktylos & Hermann, 2014). 
 
However, in the last years, several researchers have provided evidence that people are 
not solely motivated by outcome-based social preferences: they are also motivated by 
general preferences for doing the morally right thing. Capraro and Rand (2018) found 
that altruistic behavior in the Dictator Game and cooperative behavior in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma are partly driven by non-outcome-based preferences for doing the 
“nice” thing. Krupka and Weber (2013) found that framing effects in the Dictator 
                                                
1Throughout the whole paper, I will consider “self-interest” as a degenerate social preference, having in 
mind that self-interest can be recovered from social preferences assuming that the weight on the others’ 
payoffs is equal to 0.  
Game are due to changes in the perception of what is the morally appropriate thing to 
do. Numerous theoretical models have also been advanced to formalize people’s 
tendency to do the morally right thing (Alger & Weibull, 2013; Brekke, Kverndokk & 
Nyborg, 2003; DellaVigna, List & Malmendier, 2012; Huck, Kübler, & Weibull, 
2012; Kessler & Leider, 2012; Kimbrough & Vostroktunov, 2016; Krupka & Weber, 
2013; Lazear, Malmendier & Weber, 2012; Levitt & List, 2017; Weber, Kopelman & 
Messick, 2004).  
 
These observations raise important questions regarding the Ultimatum Game. Do 
moral preferences play a role in the Ultimatum Game? Could it be the case that 
proposers make high offers just because they think that this is the right thing to do? 
Could it be the case that responders reject low offers because they think that this is the 
right thing to do? 
 
Here, I would like to shed light on these questions. The paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 reviews previous literature and finds that, indeed, very little is known about 
the role of moral preferences on UG behavior. Section 3 reports a preliminary study 
which shows that people self-report that making high offers and rejecting low offers 
are the morally right things to do. Section 4 develops the theoretical background 
towards my main experiment, the aim of which is to investigate the extent to which 
making high offers and rejecting low offers are caused by moral preferences. Section 
5 reports the main experiment and finds that moral preferences play no major roles in 
determining UG behavior. Instead, the best explanation for the results is that: (i) high 
UG offers are motivated by inequity aversion and, to a lesser extent, self-interest; (ii) 
rejection of low offers is motivated by inequity aversion. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.   Literature review  
 
The literature on the UG is enormous, counting thousands, if not tens of thousands, 
papers. In this section I provide a short, but comprehensive, description of the main 
frameworks that have been advanced to explain the behavior of proposers and 
responders.  
 
I will mainly focus on theories grounded on outcome-based social preferences: 
inequity aversion, a desire to decrease payoff differences; social efficiency, a desire to 
increase the sum of the payoffs of all players; spitefulness, a desire to be better off 
than the other player(s), even at one’s own cost; and self-interest, a desire to increase 
one’s own payoff (which can be thought as a degenerate social preference, where 
subjects care about others’ payoffs with weight equal to 0). I will focus on these 
motivations because previous research has found compelling evidence that they all 
play a major role in driving people’s decision making (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; 
Capraro, Corgnet, Espín & Hernán-González, 2017; Charness & Rabin, 2002; 
Corgnet, Espín & Hernán-González, 2015; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 
Otten, DeBruin & Joireman, 1997). 
 
Of course, since my goal is to investigate the extent to which moral preferences 
determine UG behavior, I will also discuss studies exploring the effect of moral 
preferences. To the best of my knowledge, there are only two such studies 
(Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016; Eriksson, Strimling, Anderson & Lindholm, 
2017).  
 
Finally, in the last paragraph of this section, I will also shortly discuss approaches 
beyond social and moral preferences.   
 
Responders 
 
It has been widely observed that responders reject low offers and that fair offers are 
virtually always accepted (Güth et al, 1982; Camerer, 2003; Güth & Kocher, 2014). 
Somewhat more surprisingly, it has been noted that sometimes people even reject 
super-fair offers, larger than half of the pie (Güth, Schmidt & Sutter, 2003). Why so? 
 
Earlier accounts took these results as evidence that responders are motivated by 
inequity aversion: they reject low offers because they create inequity between the 
proposer and the responder (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). By 
assuming that some responders are averse to advantageous inequalities these accounts 
can easily explain also why experimenters see a small proportion of rejection of 
super-fair offers.  
 
However, this interpretation has been recently found incomplete, as evidence emerged 
of a class of subjects who reject unfair offers motivated by spiteful preferences, that 
is, by a desire to be better off than the proposer, motivation, which, in the case of a 
UG responder who receives a low offer, happens to generate the same behavior as 
inequity aversion (Yamagishi et al 2012; Brañas-Garza, Espín, Exadaktylos & 
Hermann, 2014; Espín, Exadaktylos, Hermann & Brañas-Garza, 2015; Yamagishi et 
al, 2017). For example, Brañas-Garza et al (2014) demonstrated that there are subjects 
who reject low offers in the UG but donate nothing when playing the Dictator Game 
(DG) as dictators (the DG is similar to the UG, but the responder makes no choice and 
only gets what the first person, the dictator, decides to give. The DG allows to explore 
the effect of inequity aversion without any strategic confound. Thus, if rejections of 
low offers were solely motivated by inequity aversion, then people who reject low 
offers in the UG should give in the DG).  
 
Another stream of research investigated the effect of time pressure and time delay on 
rejection rates. Grimm & Mengel (2011) found that an exogenously imposed delay 
decreases rejection of low offers. Complementarily, Sutter et al (2013) found that 
time pressure increases rejection of low offers. Since time pressure increases both 
inequity aversion and spitefulness (Capraro et al, 2017), these results fit well with the 
aforementioned interpretation that rejection of low offers is driven by a combination 
of inequity aversion and spitefulness.   
 
Neuroscientific research has shed further light on the topic by suggesting a role for 
both emotion and cognition in the rejection of low offers (Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, 
Lieberman & Robbins, 2008; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2003; 
van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey & Aleman, 2006; Yamagishi, Horita, Takagishi, Shinada, 
Tanida & Cook, 2009). For example, Yamagishi et al (2017) concluded that 
“[s]piteful punishers anticipate pleasure from seeing their target suffer by rejecting 
unfair offers, while altruistic punishers reject unfair offers as a deliberate attempt to 
punish norm violators (as in the TPPG [Third-Party Punishment Game]), rather than 
seeking pleasure from enforcing fairness norms”. How to interpret this conclusion 
from the perspective of social (and moral) preferences is unclear. It seems to suggest 
that altruistic punishers may not be guided solely by a desire to decrease inequality, 
but also (and potentially only) by a more abstract desire of doing the morally right 
thing. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, only two studies explored directly a potential effect of 
morality on rejection of low offers. Kimbrough & Vostroknutov (2016) found a 
positive correlation between rejection of low offers and rule-following in an unrelated 
task. Although interesting, this correlational study does not clarify whether rejections 
of low offers are actually caused by preferences for following the rules. An 
exogenous manipulation to show causality has been implemented by Eriksson et al 
(2017), who found that when the action of rejecting is framed as “payoff reduction” 
(of the other participant’s payoff), then people rejection rates decline, and the action 
of “reducing the payoff” is judged to be more morally wrong, compared to when the 
choice is simply called “rejection”. This provides a first piece of evidence that moral 
considerations play a causal role in determining rejection of low offers. However, 
how big this role is remains unclear. Is rejection of low offers entirely driven by 
moral preferences? What is the relative proportion of inequity aversion and moral 
preferences in determining rejections of low offers?   
 
None of the previous studies can answer these questions. Not even those providing 
evidence of a correlation between rejection of low offers and DG giving (Branas-
Garza et al, 2014; Capraro et al, 2015). The reason is simple: DG giving is not 
evidence of inequity aversion as it is partly motivated by general moral preferences 
for doing the right thing (Capraro & Rand, 2018). 
 
To summarize this part, previous research suggests that rejection of low offers is 
driven by a combination of spitefulness and fairness enforcement. However, it is not 
clear the extent to which fairness enforcement is driven by outcome-based preferences 
for minimizing inequities or by a general moral preference for doing the morally right 
thing.  
 
Proposers 
 
Proposers offer typically between 30% and 50% of the pie, well above the 
equilibrium predictions (Güth et al, 1982; Camerer, 2003; Güth & Kocher, 2014). 
Why so?  
 
One popular explanation assumes that, actually, only responders violate the theory of 
self-interest: assuming that proposers know that low offers will be rejected, then it is 
in their self-interest to make high offers (Chen et al, 2017; Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-
Fujiwara & Zamir,1991; Wells & Rand, 2013). For example, Roth et al (1991) 
reported UG experiments from four countries showing that the most common offer 
was the choice maximizing the proposer’s payoff, conditional on the rejections rate. 
However, this explanation has been criticized by more recent accounts. Lin & Sunder 
(2002) found that the 60% of the proposers offered more than the payoff-maximizing 
amount. Henrich et al (2001) analyzed UG offers in 15 small-scale societies and 
found that, in most cases, the modal offer was substantially higher than the payoff-
maximizing one. This suggests that self-interest alone is unlikely to explain 
proposers’ behavior. Following this line, Camerer (2003) concluded that “some of 
their generosity in ultimatum games is altruistic rather than strategic” (p. 56).  
 
Is this altruistic component driven by inequity aversion or by a general moral 
tendency of doing the morally right thing? To the best of my knowledge, only one 
study has explored the role of moral preferences on UG offers. Kimbrough & 
Vostroknutov (2016) found no correlation between UG offers and rule-following in a 
separated task. This provides a first piece of evidence that moral preferences have 
little to do with UG offers. 
 
To summarize this part, previous research suggests that high offers in the UG are 
driven by a combination of self-interest and fairness/altruism. However, very little is 
known about whether fairness/altruism is driven by outcome-based social preferences 
for minimizing inequities of by moral preferences for doing the morally right thing.  
 
Other explanations 
 
Theories beyond social and moral preferences have also been proposed. For example, 
Capraro et al (2015) applied the notion of cooperative equilibrium (Capraro, 2013; 
Barcelo & Capraro, 2015) to the UG and found that it makes reasonable predictions of 
average behavior of proposers. Similarly, Schuster (2017) and Suleiman (2017) 
introduced novel solution concepts providing theoretical explanations for why UG 
offers are, on average, typically close to the Golden Ratio. However, although these 
models make reasonably good predictions of proposers’ average behavior, there is no 
evidence that real people actually follow any of the supposed lines of reasoning.  
 
Other frameworks make use of bounded rationality and explain the behavior of 
proposers as a failure to use backward induction (Brenner & Vriend, 2006). However, 
experimental research has shown that bounded rationality is likely to play very little 
role in determining proposers’ decisions. For example, Avrahami et al (2010) 
conducted a repeated ultimatum game with random re-matching and found a very 
quick convergence to proposers offering and responders demanding the equal share. 
Similarly, and even more convincingly, Cooper and Dutcher (2011), in a meta-
study, provided evidence that behavior in repeated ultimatum games with random re-
matching after each interaction seems similar to learning a norm: with experience, 
acceptance rates of low offers even decline.  
Another line of research explores the evolutionary mechanisms that can promote 
fairness in a population of selfish individuals. For example, Nowak, Page & Sigmund 
(2000) showed that fairness will evolve if the proposer can obtain information about 
responder’s past rejection rates. Szolnoki, Perc and Szabó (2012a) found that 
accuracy in strategy imitations promotes the evolution of fairness. Szolnoki, Perc and 
Szabó (2012b) found that empathy leads to the evolution of equality. Rand et al 
(2013) applied stochastic evolutionary game theory, where agents make mistakes 
when judging the payoffs and strategies of others, to show that natural selection 
favors fairness. Although these and similar studies are extremely interesting because 
they may help us understand the ultimate origin of fairness, the focus of the current 
work is on proximate explanations.  
To summarize this literature review section, very little is known about the role of 
moral preferences in UG behavior. The goal of the next sections is to shed some light 
on this role. 
 
3.   A preliminary study: What’s the right thing to do in the UG? 
 
One preliminary question is in order. Do people recognize that the morally right thing 
to do in the UG is to give half and to reject low offers? 
 
To answer these questions, I conducted a small study in which subjects (living in the 
US and recruited using the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk, AMT2) 
were presented the rules of the UG and then were asked the following questions in 
random order: “What do you think is the morally right offer?” and “What do you 
think it is the morally right minimum offer for you to accept?” I refer to the Appendix 
for the exact instructions3. 
 
Results showed that proposers overwhelmingly said that offering half was the morally 
right thing to do (N=177, 92% chose “offer half”), while responders that demanding 
half was the morally right thing to do (N=176, 72% chose “demand half”). 
 
These results confirm that subjects recognize that the Ultimatum Game has a moral 
component. However, they do not clarify whether this moral component plays a 
causal role in determining UG behavior. Answering this question is the goal of my 
main study. 
 
 
4.   Theoretical model and behavioral predictions 
 
Having established, by the literature review, that previous research is essentially silent 
about the role of morality on UG behavior, and having established, by a preliminary 
study, that subjects think that the UG has a moral component, here I develop a 
theoretical background to test the hypothesis that morality has a causal impact on UG 
behavior.  
 
The Trade-Off game 
 
In Capraro & Rand (2018) we used the Trade-Off Game (TOG) to show that a 
significant proportion of subjects are motivated by a general morality preference, and 
                                                
2Experiments on AMT are easy to implement and fast and cheap to realize, because subjects participate 
from their homes in an incentivized survey that takes no more than a few minutes. This allows 
researcher to decrease the participation fee and the game stakes significantly, without damaging the 
quality of the results. Numerous studies using economic games have indeed found that data gathered on 
AMT are of no less quality than those collected using physical laboratories (Amir, Rand, & Gal, 2012; 
Arechar, Gächter & Molleman, 2018; Brañas-Garza, Capraro, Rascón-Ramírez, 2018; Horton, Rand, & 
Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Mason & Suri, 
2012; Thomas & Clifford, 2017).  
3In the original study, subjects were asked to report what they think is the morally right thing to do also 
in the Dictator Game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Trade-Off game. Results were reported 
elsewhere (Capraro and Rand, 2018). Here I focus on the Ultimatum Game. 
that this morality preference plays a major role in determining Dictator game and 
Prisoner’s dilemma behavior.  
 
In the TOG, the decision-maker has to decide between two allocations of money that 
affect three players, the decision maker herself and two other players. Crucially, one 
allocation minimizes inequities: E = [13 13 13] (i.e., 13 cents to each of the three 
players); while the other one maximizes the social welfare: S = [15 23 13] (e.g., the 
decision maker gets 15 cents, the second player gets 23 cents, the third player gets 13 
cents). The TOG is played in either of two frames. In the Give frame, choices are 
presented in such a way that participants are led to believe that the socially efficient 
choice is the right thing to do (e.g., the allocation [15 23 13] is named “nice choice”, 
while the allocation [13 13 13] is called “not nice choice”); in the Equalize frame, the 
choices are presented in such a way that participants are led to believe that the 
equitable choice is the right thing to do (e.g., the allocation [13 13 13] is named “nice 
choice”, while the allocation [15 23 13] is called “not nice choice”. The idea is that 
inequity averse and spiteful subjects will choose the allocation [13 13 13] regardless 
of the frame; socially efficient and self-interested subjects will choose the allocation 
[15 23 13] regardless of the frame; subject who are motivated by general preferences 
for doing the right thing will choose the option that is presented as the nice option, 
regardless of the frame4. In Capraro & Rand (2018) we showed two main results: (i) 
the frame has a massive impact on choices; (ii) people who make the nice choice in 
TOG are more likely to act altruistically in a one-shot Dictator Game (DG) and 
cooperatively in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). This led us to conclude that DG 
altruism and PD cooperation are partly driven by a desire of doing the right thing to 
do. 
 
Here I apply a similar technique: participants will play both the TOG and the UG and 
I will explore the correlation between framing manipulation in the TOG and UG 
behavior. Comparing the results with the formal predictions that I will derive in the 
next section will allow me to deduce which motivations are responsible for UG 
behavior. 
 
Theoretical model 
 
Notation 
 
•   N will denote the frame-dependent nice choice in the TOG, that is, the choice 
that is presented to be the nice choice (remember that E and S denote 
respectively the equitable and the social efficient choices).  
•   pE will denote the offer made by a UG proposer chosen at random among 
those who choose option E in the TOG. Similarly, I define pS and pN. And 
similarly I define rE, rS, and rM (where r stands for responder). 
•   Thus, pE, pS, etc., are discrete random variables with values in the interval 
[0,1]. I will denote M(pE), M(pS), etc., their mean value, which I assume to be 
well defined and exact (i.e., the mean value that one would find, had he or she 
the possibility to collect countably many observations). 
                                                
4Of course, framing effect in this case can be also driven by an experimenter demand effect. This is not 
an issue, as susceptibility to experimenter demand effects is an instance of norm-sensitivity 
(Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016). 
 
Model 
 
I assume that each subject comes with a motivation (or preference, or type) m and 
chooses in UG and TOG according to m, that is, motivations are constant across 
games5. Moreover, I assume that there are only three possible motivations: inequity 
aversion (IA), self-interest (SI), and morality (M)6. I make very light assumptions on 
the distribution of these motivations in the population. For the formal arguments to 
work, it is enough that a significant proportion of the population is motivated by each 
of these motivations. In formal terms, I introduce a parameter a representing the 
proportion of IA versus M subjects and a parameter b representing the proportion of 
SI versus M subjects. With this notation, I require that a, b > 0. 
 
In the model, subjects make a decision in both the TOG and the UG. Since the TOG 
has no strategic component, I assume that the decision in the TOG is entirely 
dependent on the subject’s type as follows: IA subjects choose E regardless of the 
TOG frame; SI subjects choose S, regardless of the TOG frame; M subjects choose N, 
regardless of the TOG frame.  
 
Since the UG has a strategic component, I cannot make a priori assumptions on how 
subjects will play the UG as a function of their motivations. Indeed, the whole point 
of the model is to derive predictions about the correlation between TOG and UG 
behaviors for all possible assumptions about the driving motivations of UG behavior.  
 
Finally, two minor and essentially only technical assumptions. I assume that M(pSI) < 
M(pIA), that is, that the average offer made by IA subjects is significantly smaller than 
the average offer made by SI subjects. Two observations about this requirement: first, 
it allows to reduce the number of cases to be analyzed (in the next subsection), using a 
reasonable assumption that has been supported by experimental studies showing a 
positive correlation between DG giving and UG offers (Branas-Garza et al, 2014; 
Capraro et al, 2015); second, the derivation of predictions for the remaining cases 
M(pSI) = M(pIA) and M(pSI) > M(pIA) is very simple, as it is simple to the see that they 
are not satisfied by the results of the experiment. For similar reasons, I assume that 
M(rSI) < M(rIA).  
 
Behavioral predictions 
 
The general structure of this section is as follows. For every order position of M(pM) 
with respect to M(pSI) and M(pIA), I will deduce, when possible, an order relation 
between M(pE) and M(pS). Similarly, for responders. Testing which of these order 
relations are satisfied will be the goal of the main experiment.  
                                                
5The assumption that motivations/preferences are constant across games is somehow implicit in 
behavioral economics, and has received some initial support from research showing that prosocial 
choices in different economic games are all correlated (Capraro, Jordan & Rand, 2014; Capraro, 
Smyth, Mylona & Niblo, 2014; Peysakhovich, Nowak & Rand 2014; Reigstad, Strømland & Tinghög, 
2017), which led to the definition of “cooperative phenotype” (Peysakhovich, Nowak & Rand 2014). 
6My design will not allow me to distinguish spitefulness from inequity aversions and social efficiency 
from self-interested. Although, I acknowledge, this is a general limitation of the design, I believe that 
this is not an issue, because the experiment is designed to distinguish social preferences from moral 
preferences. Understanding which social preference is at play is not the purpose of this work. Although 
I will be able to partly answer this question. 
 
Case 1. If M(pM) < M(pSI) < M(pIA) 
 
Consider the TOG in the Equalize frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA 
subjects and by M subjects, thus: M(pE) =  aM(pIA) + (1-a)M(pM). The efficient 
choice S is taken by SI subjects only, thus: M(pS) = M(pSI). Since M(pSI) is strictly 
between M(pIA) and M(pM), and since a > 0, I cannot conclude anything about 
whether M(pE) is smaller or greater than M(pS). It can be anything. 
 
Consider the TOG in the Give frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA subjects 
only, thus: M(pE) = M(pIA). The efficient choice S is taken by SI subjects and by M 
subjects, thus: M(pS) =  bM(pSI) + (1-b)M(pM). Since M(pSI) and M(pM) are both 
strictly smaller than M(pIA), so it will any of their convex combinations. Thus: M(pS) 
< M(pE). 
 
Prediction 1. If M(pM) < M(pSI) < M(pIA), then, in the Give frame we should have 
M(pS) < M (pE), while no particular order relation between M(pS) and M(pE) is 
predicted in the Equalize frame. 
 
Case 2. If M(pM) = M(pSI) < M(pIA) 
 
Consider the TOG in the Equalize frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA 
subjects and by M subjects, thus: M(pE) =  aM(pIA) + (1-a)M(pM). The efficient 
choice S is taken by SI subjects only, thus: M(pS) = M(pSI) = M(pM). Since a > 0 and 
M(pIA) > M(pM), then: M(pS) < M(pE). 
 
Consider the TOG in the Give frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA subjects 
only, thus: M(pE) = M(pIA). The efficient choice S is taken by SI subjects and by M 
subjects, thus: M(pS) =  bM(pSI) + (1-b)M(pM). Thus, M(pS) < M(pE). 
 
Prediction 2. If M(pM) = M(pSI) < M(pIA), then M(pS) < M(pE) in both TOG frames. 
 
Case 3. If M(pSI) < M(pM) < M(pIA) 
 
Consider the TOG in the Equalize frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA 
subjects and by M subjects, thus: M(pE) =  aM(pIA) + (1-a)M(pM). The efficient 
choice S is taken by SI subjects only, thus: M(pS) = M(pSI). Since M(pSI) < M(pM), 
M(pIA), then: M(pS) < M(pE). 
 
Consider the TOG in the Give frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA subjects 
only, thus: M(pE) = M(pIA). The efficient choice S is taken by SI subjects and by M 
subjects, thus: M(pS) =  bM(pSI) + (1-b)M(pM). Then, also in this case: M(pS) < 
M(pE). 
 
Prediction 3. If M(pSI) < M(pM) < M(pIA), then M(pS) < M(pE) in both TOG frames. 
 
Case 4. If M(pSI) < M(pM) = M(pIA) 
 
Consider the TOG in the Equalize frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA 
subjects and by M subjects, thus: M(pE) =  aM(pIA) + (1-a)M(pM). The efficient 
choice S is taken by SI subjects only, thus: M(pS) = M(pSI). Then: M(pS) < M(pE). 
 
Consider the TOG in the Give frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA subjects 
only, thus: M(pE) = M(pIA). The efficient choice S is taken by SI subjects and by M 
subjects, thus: M(pS) =  bM(pSI) + (1-b)M(pM). Then: M(pS) < M(pE). 
 
Prediction 4. If M(pSI) < M(pM) = M(pIA), then M(pS) < M(pE) in both TOG frames. 
 
Case 5. If M(pSI) < M(pIA) < M(pM) 
 
Consider the TOG in the Equalize frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA 
subjects and by M subjects, thus: M(pE) =  aM(pIA) + (1-a)M(pM). The efficient 
choice S is taken by SI subjects only, thus: M(pS) = M(pSI). Then: M(pS) < M(pE). 
 
Consider the TOG in the Give frame. The equitable choice E is taken by IA subjects 
only, thus: M(pE) = M(pIA). The efficient choice S is taken by SI subjects and by M 
subjects, thus: M(pS) =  bM(pSI) + (1-b)M(pM). Since M(pIA) is between M(pSI) and 
M(pM) and since b > 0, we cannot deduce predictions regarding the order relation 
between M(pS) and M(pE). 
 
Prediction 5. If M(pSI) < M(pIA) < M(pM), then M(pS) < M(pE) in the Equalize frame, 
while in the Give frame there is no special order relation. 
 
Of course, the same predictions hold also for the responder’s behavior. 
 
 
5.   Main experiment 
 
Subjects  
 
Subjects, living in the US at the time of the experiment, were recruited using the 
online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).  
 
Procedure  
 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: UG1-Give-UG2, UG2-
Give-UG1, UG1-Equalize-UG2, and UG2-Equalize-UG1 (The notation X-Y-Z means 
that the subjects first played game X, then game Y, and finally game Z). In the UG1 
subjects played the UG as proposers. In the UG2, they played the UG as responders. 
Proposers were given $0.10 and were asked how much, if any, they wanted to offer to 
another anonymous participant, who started given nothing. Responders were asked to 
decide their MAO. If the proposer’s offer was larger than or equal to the responder’s 
MAO, then the $0.10 was split between the two subjects according to the agreed 
offer. Otherwise, both subjects earned nothing. All subjects played in both roles 
(denoted UG1 and UG2). Between the two decisions, they played the TOG in either 
the Give or the Equalize frame. Standard comprehension questions were asked to 
make sure that subjects understood the instructions. Subjects failing any 
comprehension question were automatically excluded from the survey. After the data 
were collected, bonuses were computed and paid, on top of the participation fee 
($0.50). To compute the bonuses, I randomly selected one of the two UG roles for 
each of the subjects. No deception was used. I refer to the Appendix for experimental 
instructions. 
 
Results 
 
A total of 575 subjects passed the comprehension questions. I start analyzing UG 
offers.  
 
As a first step of the analysis, I show that the order of roles in which the UG is played 
does not matter. To this end, I conduct linear regression predicting UG_offer as a 
function of three dummy variables (Give_frame = 1 if a subject participated in the 
Give frame, and 0 if, otherwise, they participated in the Equalize frame; Equal_choice 
= 1 if a subject chose the equitable option in the TOG, and 0 if they chose the efficient 
option; and the variable UG1_first = 1 if a subject played the UG1 before the TOG, 
and 0 if, otherwise, they played UG1 after the TOG) and all their interactions. I find 
that the UG1_first does not significantly predict UG_offer (coeff = -0.011, p = 0.473), 
does not significantly interact with Give_frame (coeff = 0.002, p = 0.925), does not 
interact with Equal_choice (coeff = -0.556, p = 0.254), and does not interact with 
their interaction (coeff = 0.534, p = 0.334). Thus, the order of UG play does not 
matter and I can collapse across orders. 
 
I now pass to the main analysis. Linear regression predicting UG_offer as a function 
of Equal_choice and Give_frame and their interaction reveals a significant interaction 
between Equal_choice and Give_frame (coeff = 0.072, p = 0.009). Looking at the 
main effects of Equal_choice within each frame of the TOG, I find that, in the 
Equalize frame, the average offer among subjects who chose S in the TOG was 48%, 
while the average offer among those who chose E was 46% (rank-sum, p = 0.994). 
However, in the give frame, the average offer among subjects who chose S was 44%, 
while the average offer among those who chose E was 50% (rank sum, p = 0.001). 
See Figure 1.  
 
In sum, there is a significant interaction between TOG frame and UG offers, such that 
UG offers are positively correlated with the equitable option in the TOG but only in 
the Give frame. Looking at the predictions in Section 4, I find that the only hypothesis 
that agrees with this result is: M(pM) < M(pSI) < M(pIA), that is, high offers are 
primarily driven by inequity aversion and, to a lesser extent, by self-interest. Morality 
plays no role in determining high offers. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average UG offer as a function of the choice in each of the two framings of 
the TOG. In the Equalize frame there is no significant correlation between being nice 
in the TOG and UG offer. In the Give frame there is a significant correlation between 
“not” being nice in the TOG and UG offer.  
 
Next, I analyze responders’ behavior. As before, as a first step of the analysis, I show 
that the order of play does not matter. To this end, I conduct linear regression 
predicting UG_MAO as a function of Give_frame, Equal_choice, UG_first, and all 
their interactions. I find that the UG_first does not significantly predict UG_MAO 
(coeff = -0.022, p = 0.295), does not significantly interact with Give_frame (coeff = 
0.010, p = 0.784), does not significantly interact with Equal_choice (coeff = -0.071, p 
= 0.303), and with their interaction (coeff = 0.077, p = 0.329). Since the order of play 
does not matter, I can collapse across orders.  
 
Now I pass to the main analysis. Linear regression predicting UG_MAO as a function 
of Equal_choice and Give_frame and their interaction reveals that there is no 
significant interaction between Equal_choice and Give_frame (coeff = -0.021, p = 
0.588). However, within each TOG frame, there is a significant main effect of 
Equal_choice, such that the equitable choice is positively correlated with UG_MAO. 
More precisely, in the Equalize frame, the average UG_MAO among subjects who 
made the efficient choice in the TOG was 35%, while the average UG_MAO among 
subjects who made the equitable choice in the TOG was 41% (rank-sum, p = 0.015). 
In the give frame, the average UG_MAO among subjects who made the efficient 
choice in the TOG was 34%, while the average UG_MAO among subjects who made 
the equitable choice in the TOG was 38% (rank sum, p = 0.034). See Figure 2.  
 
Thus, regardless of the TOG frame, there is a positive correlation between the 
equitable choice in the TOG and UG_MAO. Looking at the predictions in Section 4, I 
find that, a priori, three hypotheses satisfy these predictions (Case 2, Case 3, and Case 
4). However, I can easily eliminate two of them by simply observing that people 
choosing S in the equalize frame are necessarily SI (thus: M(pS) = M(pSI)), while 
people choosing S in the Give frame are either SI or M (thus: M(pE) = bM(pSI)+(1-
b)M(pM)). Since the data suggest that M(pS)=M(pE), this implies that M(pM) is likely 
to be equal to M(pSI) – or very close to it – i.e., Case 2 in Section 4 is the one that best 
describes the data. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average UG MAO as a function of the choice in each of the two framings of 
the TOG. In both frames, there is a significant positive correlation between choosing 
the equitable option and the MAO (give frame: p=0.0341; equalize frame: p=0.0149). 
 
 
General discussion 
 
How people play the Ultimatum Game has intrigued generations of social scientists, 
who have proposed a range of explanations for why experimental subjects violate the 
equilibrium predictions. These explanations make typically use of (a combination of) 
social preferences: inequity aversion, self-interest, spitefulness, and social efficiency. 
Despite thousands of papers, however, still very little is known about the effect of 
general moral preferences for doing the right thing. These preferences, in the last 
years, have been found to play a major role in other games involving social 
interactions, such as the Dictator game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Capraro & Rand, 
2018; Krupka & Weber, 2013). This raises important questions: Could it be the case 
that people violate the economic predictions in the UG just because they think that is 
the morally right thing to do? What role do moral preferences play in determining UG 
behavior? 
 
The main goal of the current work was to answer these questions. I reported two 
experiments providing clear evidence that, despite the fact that people recognize that 
the morally right thing to do in the UG is to make high offers and reject low offers 
(preliminary study), general moral preferences do not play a major role in determining 
proposers’ and responders’ behavior (main study).  
 
The implemented design allows me to tell also something about what motivates actual 
choices. I have developed a theoretical model in which people are motivated by three 
possible motivations (inequity aversion, self-interest, morality). I then formally 
derived predictions from this model and I compared the experimental results with 
these theoretical predictions. In doing so, I found that the results are well fit by a 
model assuming that: (i) high UG offers are motivated by inequity aversion and, to a 
lesser extent, self-interest; (ii) high MAOs are motivated by inequity aversion. 
 
This model complements and extends the classical explanations that have been 
proposed to explain UG behavior by adding a moral dimension to them. Previous 
studies on the behavior of proposers have repeatedly found that high offers are driven 
by a combination of fairness and self-interest. The current results confirm this view, 
by adding that fairness is driven by aversion to economic inequalities, rather than by 
an abstract preference for doing the morally right thing. Previous results on the 
behavior of responders found that high MAOs are mainly driven by inequity aversion 
(and spitefulness). These findings confirm that inequity aversion is an important 
driver of high MAOs (the current design does not allow us to distinguish inequity 
aversion from spitefulness).  
 
The model and the experimental design presented in this paper are silent regarding the 
role of spitefulness and social efficiency on UG behavior. This limitation is especially 
important in the case of spitefulness, as previous research has suggested that rejection 
of low offers is partly driven by spitefulness preferences (Yamagishi et al 2012; 
Brañas-Garza, Espín, Exadaktylos & Hermann, 2014; Espín, Exadaktylos, Hermann 
& Brañas-Garza, 2015; Yamagishi et al, 2017). In principle, also high offers might be 
driven by spiteful preferences, because the behavior driven by spiteful preferences 
happen to coincide with that driven by self-regarding preferences. However, to the 
best of my knowledge, no studies have explored the effect of spitefulness on UG 
offers. Doing a more fine-grained analysis of UG motivations by exploring also the 
strength of spitefulness relative to inequity aversion (for responders) and self-interest 
(for proposers) is certainly an important avenue for future research. 
 
Of course, saying that morality does not play a major role in determining UG 
behavior is different from saying that it plays no role. The preliminary study has 
shown that subjects recognize that making high offers and rejecting low offers are the 
morally right things to do. In a similar vein, Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016) 
found a correlation between rule-following and rejection of low offers, although they 
found no correlation between rule-following and high offers. In any case, it is possible 
that special framings of the game can make the morality salient and change people’s 
behavior accordingly. This might explain the presence of moral framings in the UG, 
as the ones explored reported by Eriksson et al (2017).  
 
In a nutshell, these results shed lights on the motivations underlying behavior in the 
Ultimatum Game: high offers are driven by a combination of inequity aversion and 
self-interest; rejection of low offers are driven by inequity aversion; moral preferences 
play very little role in determining proposers’ and responders’ behavior. 
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Experimental instructions 
 
We report the detailed experimental instructions only of the Main Study. The 
instructions of the Preliminary Study were identical, apart from the following 
differences: in case of UG1, the question “You are Person A, what amount do you 
want offer to Person B?” was replaced by the question ““What do you think is the 
morally right offer?”; in case of UG 2, the question “You are Person B. Please select 
below your minimum acceptable offer. That is, if the offer that A gives you is below 
this, you will reject it, and if the offer that A gives you is above or equal to this, you 
will accept it” was replaced by the question “What do you think it is the morally right 
minimum offer for you to accept?”. 
 
Ultimatum Game in the role of the proposer 
 
In this interaction you are matched with another participant. 
 
One of you will be Person A, one of you will be Person B. 
 
Person A starts with $0.10, Person B starts with $0. 
 
First Person A makes a choice, then Person B responds. 
 
1) Person A will make an offer on how to split the $0.10 with Person B. 
 
2) Person B will either accept or reject this offer. 
 
If Person B accepts, then B will get the offered amount and A will keep the rest. If B 
rejects the offer, then both individuals will get $0. 
 
Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand the rules. Remember that 
you have to answer all of these questions correctly in order to get the completion 
code. If you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and you will not get 
any payment.  
 
What is the offer that Person A should make in order to equalize his and Person B's 
gain? 
 
A)   $0 
B)   $0.01 
C)   $0.02 
D)   $0.03 
E)   $0.04 
F)   $0.05 
G)   $0.06 
H)   $0.07 
I)   $0.08 
J)   $0.09 
K)   $0.10 
 
What happens if B accepts an offer of $0.02? 
 -­‐‑   A gets $0.08 and B gets $0.02. -­‐‑   A gets $0 and B gets $0. 
 
What happens if B rejects an offer of $0.02? 
 -­‐‑   A gets $0.08 and B gets $0.02. -­‐‑   A gets $0 and B gets $0. 
 
Congratulations, you successfully answered all the questions. It is now time to make 
your decisions.  
 
You are Person A, what amount do you want offer to Person B? 
 
A)   $0 
B)   $0.01 
C)   $0.02 
D)   $0.03 
E)   $0.04 
F)   $0.05 
G)   $0.06 
H)   $0.07 
I)   $0.08 
J)   $0.09 
K)   $0.10 
 
 
Ultimatum Game in the role of the responder 
 
Instructions were exactly the same as in the previous case, a part from the very last 
sentence, which was replaced with: “You are Person B. Please select below your 
minimum acceptable offer. That is, if the offer that A gives you is below this, you will 
reject it, and if the offer that A gives you is above or equal to this, you will accept it.”  
 
 
Trade-Off game in the “give” frame 
 
You are Player A. You are playing a game with other two players, Player B and 
Player C. Each of you starts this game with $0.13. 
 
You get to make a choice (Player B and Player C do not make any decisions). 
 
You can either choose to be nice or not. If you choose to be nice, you earn an 
additional $0.02 and Player B earns an additional $0.10. If you choose not to be nice, 
no one earns any additional money and you all end the game with $0.13. 
 
This is the only interaction you have with Player B and Player C. They will not have 
the opportunity to influence your gain in later parts of the HIT.  
 
 What do you want to do? 
 
A)   Be nice 
B)   Don’t be nice 
 
 
Trade-Off game in the “equalize” frame 
 
You are playing a game with other two players, Player B and Player C. You start this 
game with $0.15, Player B starts with $0.23 and Player C with $0.13. 
 
You get to make a choice (Player B and Player C do not make any decisions). 
 
You can either choose to be nice or not. If you choose to be nice, you give up $0.02 to 
restore equality, so that you all earn $0.13. If you choose not to be nice, no changes 
are made to the payoffs, and you each earn what you have started with. 
 
This is the only interaction you have with Player B and Player C. They will not have 
the opportunity to influence your gain in later parts of the HIT.  
 
 What do you want to do? 
 
A)   Be nice 
B)   Don’t be nice 
 
